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STATE v. BRILEY: JUDICIAL EXTENSION OF THE
STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS TO THE HUSBANDWIFE TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE IN CRIMINAL
ACTIONS FOR OFFENSES COMMITTED BY
ONE SPOUSE AGAINST A THIRD PERSON

The Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Briley1 recently
held that the wife of an accused man can testify against him as to a
crime committed by him against a third person, when such crime
occurs within the same transaction as an act of criminal violence
committed by the accused upon the person of the wife. This decision raises the question of whether such a ruling is an over-extension of the exceptions to the rule of husband-wife incompetency,
as presently applicable in the state of New Jersey.'
This Note will survey the present status of the rules pertaining
to the competency of one spouse to testify against the other in
criminal proceedings in the state and federal courts and analyze
the different interpretations which state courts have given to
statutes similar to that of New Jersey. It will then assess the holding of the Briley case in light of both the current trends in the
area of law involved and the tenets of statutory interpretation.
FACTS OF STATE v. BRILEY

In State v. Briley the defendant was accused of the atrocious
assault and battery of his wife and the homicide of a third party,
Reaves. After an argument between the defendant and his wife
concerning her relationship with Reaves, she left home with the defendant's and her child and obtained temporary lodging at a nearby
motel. After searching three days, the defendant found his wife
and Reaves in the latter's automobile. He approached the vehicle
carrying a shotgun, and Reaves opened the car door to meet him.
In the ensuing struggle the shotgun was discharged and Reaves
1. 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d 442 (1969).
2. The case was decided in light of Rule 23(2) of the New Jersey
Rules of Evidence; N.J. STAT. AxN. § 2A:84A-17(2) (1968), which provides:
(2) The spouse of the accused in a criminal action shall not testify in such action except to prove the fact of marriage unless (a)
such spouse and the accused shall both consent or (b) the accused
is charged with an offense against the spouse, a child of the accused or of the spouse or a child to whom the accused or the
spouse stands in the place of a parent or (c) such spouse is the
complainant.

was killed. The defendant's wife then left her baby on the seat of
the car and fled on foot. She ran several feet, tripped and fell,
whereupon the defendant hit her several times with the butt of
the shotgun.
Counts of atrocious assault and battery and homicide were
joined in the same indictment. The defendant made a pre-trial motion to have the counts severed, but it was denied. During the trial
the defendant's wife was produced as a witness for the prosecution,
at which time the pre-trial motion to sever was renewed and again
denied. The defendant then moved to have his wife's testimony
limited to the charge of atrocious assault and battery committed
upon her and excluded with respect to the murder. This motion
was also denied. The trial resulted in a conviction for both manslaughter and atrocious assault and battery.
On appeal the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that it was
within the trial court's discretion to join in the same indictment
the two distinct crimes which arose out of the same transaction
and that, in this particular case, it was not an abuse of the court's
discretion to do so. The supreme court believed that the wife
would have been allowed to testify against the defendant as to the
murder charge regardless of whether the two counts were severed
and tried separately or were tried together. The important issue
presented was whether the wife's testimony concerning the killing
of Reaves should have been admitted.
BACKGROUND

A.

The Husband-Wife Privilege and its Rationale
At common law3 a husband or wife was incompetent to testify
in any proceeding in which the other was involved. 4 The reason
for the rule was that the husband and wife were considered one
person. 5 Today, there are presented three basic reasons why
neither the husband nor the wife may be a competent witness for
or against the other:6

(1) allowing one spouse to testify against

3. Cf. Commonwealth v. Allen, 191 Ky. 624, 626, 231 S.W. 41, 42
(1921) (the court states that the antiquity of the rule is so great that its
origin is undiscoverable).
4. See Dill v. People, 19 Colo. 469, 36 P. 229 (1894); Commonwealth
v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 99 N.E. 266 (1912); State v. Kodat, 158 Mo. 125, 59
S.W. 73 (1900); Heckman v. Heckman, 215 Pa. 203, 64 A. 425 (1906).
5. L. COKE, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON, 6b (1628): ". . . [a]
wife cannot be produced either for or against her husband 'quia sunt duae
animae in came una' (For they are two souls in one flesh)." Id.; 2 L.C.J.
HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEas oF THE CROWN, 279 (Emlyn Ed. 1736):

"[man and wife] are disabled in respect of the civil unity of their persons."
6. Cargill v. State, 25 Okla. Crim. Rep. 314, 316, 220 P. 64, 65 (1923).
See generally 8 J. WIGMOSE, EVMENCE § 2228 (McNaughten rev. 1961).

In

this section Professor Wigmore presents the leading arguments for preserving the privilege and also the reasoning of those who criticize the rule and
its policy. Wigmore agrees with the latter, stating:
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the other would lead to disruption and destruction of the family
relationship; 7 (2) because of pre-existing domestic disharmony,
one spouse may be the instrument of the other's condemnation;8
and (3) allowing one spouse to testify at the trial of the other could
lead to perjury by one spouse in defending or condemning the
otherY
An exception to the general rule of incompetency developed
at early common law. Under the exception a wife was allowed to
testify against her husband concerning an act of physical violence
committed by the husband upon the person of the wife.10 This
exception was created by necessity, partly for the protection of the
wife in her life and liberty and partly for the sake of public
justice."
B. PresentStatutory Enactments
1. Abrogation of the common law rule
Today, the admissibility of testimony by the spouse of the
2
accused in criminal cases is controlled by statutes in every state.'
No one of these supposed reasons was ever logically carried out in
the inforcing of the rule; no one of them represented adequate
cause for its existence, and no one of them, in all probability, reproduced the motives or sentiments which actually served for the
original acceptance of the rule in the 1500's.
Id. at 213-14.
7.

8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228 (McNaughten rev. 1961).

8. Knowles v. People, 15 Mich. 408, 413 (1867); Mills v. United States,
1 Pinney 73, 74-75 (Wis. 1839).
9. Davis v. Dinwoody, 4 Term. R. 678, 679, 100 Eng. Rep. 1241 (K.B.
1792).
10. Lord Audley's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 401, 402, 404 (1631).
11. People v. Zabijak, 285 Mich. 164, 280 N.W. 149 (1938); State v.
Kollenborn, 304 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1957). But see Bentley v. Cook, 3 Doug.
422, 424 (1784) (Lord Mansfield suggests that the necessity of the exception is one particularly for the protection of the wife).
12. ArLA. CODE tit. 15, § 311 (1958); ALASKA RULES OF CiuM. PRoc.,
26(b) (2) (Supp.Sept. 1966); ARz. REV. STAT.ANN. § 13-1802 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 43-2020 (1947); CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 970, 972 (West 1966); COLO.
Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84 (1958);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3502 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14.306 (1961);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.04, 932.31 (1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-160-1 (Supp.
1968); HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 621-18, -19 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 193002 (1947); § 9-203(1) (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 155-1
(Smith-Hurd 1964); IND NA ANN. STAT. §§ 2-1713, -1714 (1968); IOWA
CODE § 622.7 (1966); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1420 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 421.210 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.461 (1950); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 4 (Supp. 1968);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (1959); Micu. COMP. LAWS § 600.2162
(1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (Supp. 1969); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1689
(1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (1949); MoN-T. REV. CODES ANN. § 948802 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1203 (1964); NEv. REV. STAT. § 48.040

These statutes have developed in a variety of forms. Legislatures
in twenty-two jurisdictions have passed statutes which have the
effect of making the husband or wife of an accused person com13
petent to testify for or against his spouse in all criminal actions.
Some statutes provide that the spouse of the accused shall be considered as any other witness, that is, both competent and compellable to give testimony. 4 However, these jurisdictions continue to
recognize the privilege of keeping marital communications confidential.'
Some statutes make the spouse incompetent to disclose marital communications, 6 while others provide that he or
she cannot be compelled to disclose them.' 7 A few jurisdictions
provide that even the marital communication privilege is lost in
prosecutions of one spouse for criminal violence against the other,
child abuse, bigamy, adultery or desertion.' 8
(1967); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516.27 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17
(2) (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-1-12 (1953); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW

8H 4502, 4512 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN.

STAT.

§ 8.57 (Supp. 1967); N.D.

CENT. CODE § 31-01-02 (1960); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (Baldwin
1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 702 (1969); ORE. REv. STAT. § 139.320
(1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 683 (1936); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 12-1710 (1956); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-403 (1962); S.D. CODE § 36.0101 (1939);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40.2404 (1955); TEx. CODE CRrm. PROC. art. 38.11 (1966);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-44-4 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605 (1959);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-288 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp.
1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-3 (1966); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 325.18 (1958);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-142 (Supp. 1969).
13. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 311 (1958); CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 970, 972 (West.
1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3502 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14.306 (1961); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.04,
932.31 (1961); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-1604 (Supp. 1968); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 155-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 2-1713, -1714 (1968);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1420 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (1963);
LA. REV. STAT. § 15.461 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1315 (1964);
MD. ANN. CODE

art. 35,

§ 4 (Supp. 1968);

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 233,

§ 20 (1959); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.27 (1955); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw
§§ 4502, 4512 (McKinney 1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-17-10 (1956);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-403 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40.2404 (1955); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1605 (1959); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 325.18 (1958).
14. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.04, 932.31 (1960); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw §§
4502, 4512 (McKinney 1963); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-403 (1962) Cf. CAL. EvID.
CODE §§ 970, 972 (West. 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-84 (1958);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 35 § 4 (Supp. 1968) (providing that the spouse of the
accused may be compelled to testify concerning crimes committed one
against the other or against a child of either).
15. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit, 12, § 1605 (1959), providing:
[N]either [husband nor wife] shall be allowed to testify against
the other as to a statement, conversation, letter or other communication made to the other or to another person nor shall either be
allowed in any case to testify as to a matter which in the opinion
of the court, would lead to a violation of marital confidence.
16. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-418(1) (Supp. 1968); IND. ANN. STAT. § 21714 (1968); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (1963); LA. REv. STAT.
§ 15.461 (1950); MD. AN. CODE art. 35, § 4 (Supp. 1968); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 516.27 (1955); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 4502 (McKinney 1963);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40.2404 (1955).
17. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 311 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3502
(1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. 8§ 90.04, 932.31 (1960); S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-403

(1962).
18.

CAL. EVID. CODE

§§

980-987

(West 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
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2.

Retention of the rule

The majority of state jurisdictions are controlled by statutes
which retain the common law incompetency rule, including the
early exception, 19 in some modified form. 20 The nucleus of this
type of statute is a restatement of the common law rule which
provides:
A husband shall not be examined for or against his wife,
without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband
without his consent . . . but this rule does not apply to a
criminal action or proceeding
for a crime committed by
21
one against the other.

To this basic statutory provision, legislative enactments have
added a variety of exceptions, the extent of which varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Depending upon the jurisdiction, one
spouse may be competent to testify against the other in prosecutions for (1) incest, rape, adultery or bigamy; 22 (2) crimes against
children of either or both spouses; 23 or (3) desertion or failure to
§ 54-84 (1958); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-306 (1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 155-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1420 (1964); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20 (1959); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1605
(1959); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 325.18 (1958); Cl. ME. RE'. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 1315 (1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-17-13 (1956) (providing that the
privilege to exclude marital communications is lost in all criminal actions).
19. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
20. ALASKA R. CriM. P., 26(b) (2)
(Supp. Sept. 1966); ARIZ. Rzv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-1802 (1956); AK. STAT. ANN. § 43.2020 (1948); COLO.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7 (1963); HAWAu REV. LAWS § 621-18 (1955);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(1) (Supp. 1969), § 19-3002 (1947); IOWA CODE
§§ 622.7, 622.8 (1966); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2162 (1948); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 595.02 (Supp. 1969); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1689 (1957); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 546.260 (1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-8802 (1947); Nm.
REv. STAT. § 25.1203 (1964); NEv. REV. STAT. § 48.040 (1947); N.J. STAT.
AN.
§ 2A:84A-17(2) (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-1-12 (1953); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-57 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-02 (1960); OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 702
(1969); ORE. REv. STAT. § 139.320 (1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 683
(1936); S.D. CODE § 36.0101 (1939); TEX. CODE CRrM. PROc. art. 38.11
(1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-44-4 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.288 (1957);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.060 (Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-3
(1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-142 (Supp. 1969).
21. E.g., ALASKA R. CRIM. PRoc., 26(b) (2) (Supp. Sept 1966).
22. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802 (1956); McH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.2162 (1948); NE. REVsED STATUTES § 25-1203 (1964); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-57 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-1-12 (1953); OHIO RED.
CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (Baldwin 1964); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-142 (Supp.
1969).
23. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 9-203(1) (Supp. 1969); Mica CoMp. LAWS
§ 600.2162 (1948); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.260 (1953); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 94-8802 (1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17(2)
(1968); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40A-1-12 (1953); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.42 (Baldwin

support one's wife and children. 24
THE CURRENT TREND TOWARD COMPETENCY

In State v. Briley25 the court stated that it is the basic policy
of the law, including the New Jersey rules of evidence, 26 that every
person is qualified and compellable to be a witness and to give relevant. and competent evidence at a trial.27 The privilege, given the
accused under New Jersey Rule 23 (2)28 to exclude the adverse testimony of his spouse, was considered by the court to be "an obstacle
in the path of the normal trial objective of a search for ultimate
truth. ' 29 Thus, the court believed that the privilege should be
accepted only in those situations in which a more important public
interest is served by asserting the privilege than by allowing full
disclosure.30 When greater public interest is served by recognizing
the competency of one spouse to testify against the other and no
violence is done to the privilege as expressed in a statutory rule
of evidence, it was held that the testimony should be received. 3 1
In construing Rule 23(2), the court stated:
Sensibly construed this language does not restrict the
testimony of a wife against a husband to the particular
criminal action in which she alone is the victim of his
crime. If there is a single criminal event in which she and
others are targets or victims of the husband's criminal
conduct in the totality of the integrated incident and formal
charges are made against the husband for some or all the
offenses committed (one of which charges is for an offense
against the spouse) the wife should be a competent and
1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 702 (1969); ORE. REV. STAT. § 139.320
(1965); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 683 (1936); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
38.11 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-288 (1957); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
5.60.060 (Supp 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-3 (1966).
24. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1802 (1956); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 193002 (1947); IOWA CODE § 622.7 (1966); MICH. COMP. LAws § 600.2162
(1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (Supp. 1969); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 1689 (1957); MONT. REV. CoDsS ANN. § 94-8802 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1203 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-1-12 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 8.57 (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-02 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. tit. 22, § 702 (Baldwin 1969); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.11 (1966);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-44-4 (1953).
25. 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d 442 (1969).
26. The court refers to N.J. R. oF EVIDENCE 7, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:
84A-16 (1968); which provides:
Except as otherwise provided in these rules or by other law of this
state, (a) every person is qualified to be a witness, and (b) no person has a privilege to refuse to be a witness and (c) no person has
a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter or to produce any
object or writing and (e) no person has a privilege that another
shall not be a witness or shall not disclose any matter or shall not
produce any object or writing and (f) all relevant evidence is
admissible.
27. 53 N.J. 498, 506, 251 A.2d 442, 446 (1969).
28. Cited and quoted in note 2 supra.
29. 53 N.J. 498, 506, 251 A.2d 442, 446 (1969).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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compellable witness against her husband at the trial of
all the cases regardless of32 whether they are tried separately or in one proceeding.
It is apparent, therefore, that Briley presents a liberal view
as to situations in which the husband-wife privilege can be disregarded. In this respect the reasoning of the Briley court is analogous to that of the federal courts presented in a series of decisions
beginning with Funk v. United States,3 3 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that the wife of the accused could testify on
84
his behalf in a prosecution under the National Prohibition Act.
Previously, the federal courts had held that neither the husband
nor the wife could testify for or against the other, except as to
personal violence committed by one spouse upon the other.35 The
Funk Court asserted that since the legislature had not acted, the
federal courts could decide the issue of competency in accordance
with present day standards of wisdom and justice rather than in
accordance with "time worn" rules of the common law.3 6 The case
led to the enactment of Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure3 7 which provides:
The admissibility of evidence and the competency and
privileges of witnesses shall be governed; except when an
act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide, by the
principals of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts
of the United States in light of reason and
3
experience. 1
Presently Rule 26 is the only statutory modification which governs
the federal courts in their interpretation of the common law rule.
Even under the broad guidelines of Rule 26, however, the
Supreme Court has hesitated to completely abrogate the common
32. Id.
33. 209 U.S. 371 (1933).
34. Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305; Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch.
134, 42 Stat. 222 (repealed by Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 740, 49 Stat. 873).
35. See Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209 (1839).
36. 209 U.S. at 381-82.
37. Fm. R. Cnim. P. 26.
38. Emphasis added. The tenth circuit combined the holding of the
Funk case with the language of FED. R. Cam. P. 26 to abolish the husband-wife privilege. In Thouvenell v. Zerbst, 83 F.2d 1003 (10th Cir.
1936); and Yoder v. United States, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935), that court
recognized a clear trend toward removing incompetency and held that
only confidential communications could be excluded. But see, Brunner v.
United States, 168 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1948); Paul v. United States, 79 F.2d
561 (3d Cir. 1935). Both cases held that the spouse of the accused was
still incompetent to testify against him. The tenth circuit's holdings were
finally overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Hawkins v. United
States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).

law privilege. In Hawkins v. United States3 9 the Court held that it
was prejudical error to allow a wife to testify against her husband,
over his objection, in a prosecution for violation of the Mann Act,40
when the wife was not a victim. Although recognizing that the
Supreme Court or Congress can change or modify the common law
where circumstances or experience dictate,4 ' the Court reasoned
that the rule is necessary to foster family peace, not only to the
benefit of the husband, wife and children, but to the public as
42

well.

Further hesitancy to completely abrogate the common law
rule can be inferred from the majority opinion in the case of Wyatt v. United States43 which held that the wife of the accused, who
was the victim of her husband's Mann Act violation,4 4 could be
compelled to testify against him. Because the wife was the victim
of her husband's crime, the exception to the privilege rendered her
a competent witness against him. However, the mere fact that the
privilege to exclude testimony was lost to the accused, did not
mean that the corresponding privilege not to testify was ipso facto
lost to the witness. 45 Rather than laying down a general rule that
both privileges stand or fall together, the Court looked to the particular situation presented. It based its decision upon a supposition implied in the Mann Act that the function of the act is to protect women of such weak minds that they are deemed to have no
independent will of their own. Such weak minded women,
therefore, are not considered capable of making the decision as to
46
whether or not they wish to testify against their spouse.
The dissenting opinion in the Wyatt case, written by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren, and Mr. Justices Black and Douglas, stated that
even this narrow holding was an over-extension of the rule. To the
dissenting justices, such a holding amounted to judicial legislation.47 They felt that congressional action was needed to abrogate
the common law rule, stating:
39. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1959).
41.

Congress or the Supreme Court is given this power in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3771 (1959).

42. 358 U.S. at 77. But Mr. Justice Stewart in the concurring opinion
expressed doubt as to the necessity of the privilege:
Any rule that impedes the discovery of truth in a court of law
impedes as well the doing of justice. When such a rule is the
product of a conceptualism long ago discarded, is universally criticized by scholars and has been qualified or abandoned in many
jurisdictions, it should receive the most careful scrutiny. Surely
"reason and experience" require that we do more than indulge in
mere assumptions, perhaps naive assumptions as to the importance
of the ancient rule to the interests of domestic tranquillity.
Id. at 81-82 (concurring opinion).
43. 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1959).
45. 362 U.S. at 529.
46. Id. at 530.
47. Id. at 534 (dissenting opinion).
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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 must be exercised
with awareness of the distinction between matters which
fall within the special competency of the judiciary and
those which are primarily the concern of the legislation.
Criticism of the common law rule contains value judgments
which the legislature is far
48 better adapted to accept or reject than is the judiciary.
GENERAL RULE REGARDING THE SPOUSES INCOMPETENcY As TO CRIMES
COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED AGAINST THIRD PERSONS

Decisions dealing with an issue concerning the husband-wife
privilege, similar to that presented in State v. Briley49 are few. 50

In State v. Woodrow51 the defendant was convicted of the murder
of his fourteen month old child, who was in the arms of the defendant's wife when shot, the bullet passing through the child and
into his wife. On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court held
that prejudicial error occurred when the trial court allowed the
wife to testify against her husband at the trial for the murder of
the child. The decision was based on the common law exception
which was limited to prosecutions for violence committed directly
upon the testifying spouse. 52 Although there was but one bullet
fired, the court decided that two distinct crimes occurred; shooting
the child could not be considered personal violence against the
spouse.53
54
The same result was reached in Georgia in Grier v. State.
The defendant shot at his wife with the intention of killing her.
The bullet missed its target and killed her child. At the murder
trial the defendant's wife was allowed to testify under a statute
which provided that the spouse of the accused was incompetent to
testify except in the case of a crime committed upon his or her person.5 5 The Supreme Court of Georgia held that since the defendant
48. Id. at 535 (dissenting opinion).
49. 53 N.J. 498, 251 A.2d 442 (1969).
50. The only case cited by the New Jersey court which, under a similar fact situation, allowed the wife to testify against her husband concerning
a crime upon a third person is People v. Pillitto, 116 Cal. App. 2d 373, 253
P.2d 705 (1953) (decided under CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1881 (1) (West 1954)
(repealed 1965). This statute provided that the general disqualification of
one spouse as a witness against the other has no application in a criminal
action for a crime committed against another person by such spouse while
engaged in committing a crime against the other spouse.
51. 58 W. Va. 527, 52 S.E. 545 (1905).
52. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
53. 58 W. Va. 527, 529, 52 S.E. 545, 546 (1905).
54. 158 Ga. 321, 123 S.E. 210 (1924).
55. No. 1880-1 (1866) Ga. Acts 139. Statutes subsequently enacted in
both Georgia and West Virginia have changed these holdings. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 38-1604 (Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-3 (1966).

was being tried for the murder of the child and not attempted
murder of the wife, it was prejudicial to allow her to testify against
him."6
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, however, reached a different
result in Miller v. State.5 7 The court held that it was proper for
the wife of the accused to state all the facts relating to the commission of the crime committed against her notwithstanding that
her evidence may tend to convict him of another and different
5
crime committed at the same time and in the same transaction.
In Miller the defendant had entered the house of his wife's parents
and there shot his wife, her mother and her father. Three counts
of felonious assault were joined in the same indictment and tried
together. At the trial the defendant's wife was allowed to testify
as to each shooting. The jury found the defendant guilty only of
the charge of shooting his wife.
Ordinarily, in cases of felony where two or more distinct crimes
are contained in the same indictment, either the indictment would
be quashed or the prosecutor compelled to elect upon which charge
he will rely for conviction. 9 On appeal, however, the court held
that there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to make the prosecutor elect in this case since the defendant was acquitted of all of
the charges except the one accusing him of shooting his wife.60
Furthermore, the court believed that there was sufficient evidence
to sustain the verdict.6 1 The case was decided under a statute 2
which allowed the wife to testify as to a crime committed against
her. The court considered the shot fired at her so closely related
to those fired at her mother and father as to be part of the res
gestae.6
The above case, cited in State v. Briley, held that the testimony
of the wife was admissible as to the whole transaction. However,
the Miller case did not hold that the accused's wife would be a competent witness against her husband if the counts pertaining to the
crimes against the third persons had been severed and tried at
56. Both State v. Woodrow, 58 W. Va. 527, 52 S.E. 545 (1905); and
Grier v. State, 158 Ga. 321, 123 S.E. 210 (1924) contain dissenting opinions. The dissent in Woodrow criticized that case's decision as being too
narrow. 58 W. Va. at 536, 52 S.E. at 551 (dissenting opinion). The dissenting justices in Grier found it difficult to distinguish between the crime
committed against the testifying spouse and that committed against the
child. 158 Ga. at 330, 123 S.E. at 216 (dissenting opinion).
57. 78 Neb. 645, 111 N.W. 637 (1907).
58. Id. at 645, 111 N.W. at 637.
59. Id. at 648, 111 N.W. at 638.
60. Id. at 647, 111 N.W. at 637-38.
61. Id. at 648, 111 N.W. at 638.
62. Acts of 1905, ch. 172, § 1, Neb. Laws 655 (now NEB. REv. STATS.
§ 25-1203 (1964) ).
63. 1 J. WiMoRE, EVIDENCE § 213 (3rd ed. 1940). The evidentiary
rule provides that other misconduct of a defendant may be receivable as
"necessary parts of the proof of the entire deed or concomitant parts of the
criminal act or inseparable elements of the deed." Id. at 722.
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separate proceedings. The Miller case was decided upon the evidentiary rule of res gestae. 4 The res gestae embraces, in addition
to the actual facts of the transaction and the circumstances surrounding it, matters immediately preceding and having a direct
causal connection with it and acts immediately following the transaction so closely connected with it as to form a part of the occurrence.6 5 Applying this rule to the Briley case would allow the
wife to testify as to the crime committed by her husband against a
third party as part of the res gestae of the crime committed against
her at the trial for the latter offense. However, the rule as presented in Miller, because of the factual situation from which it
arose, could not be extended to make the wife a competent witness
to testify at a separate proceeding against her husband concerning
his crime against a third party. This is the effect which the Briley
court gave to the res gestae rule.
The issue in Briley presented itself in Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Clanton.66 The defendant's alleged wife was allowed to testify against him as to crimes committed upon herself
and a third person who was with her at the time. The Pennsylvania statute 7 excluded evidence of the spouse of the accused
except in criminal prosecutions for violence done or threatened
upon the other or minor child of either.
The testimony was allowed because it was discovered that at
the time of the witness's alleged marriage to the defendant, she
was already married to another; therefore a valid marriage between
her and the defendant did not exist.68 The court, however, discussed the problem of deciding the competency of the spouse to
testify under the Pennsylvania statute, which would have presented itself had the marriage been a valid one. It stated:
The Pennsylvania Act was intended to make competency
the rule and incompetency the exception and a narrow construction of the act would often result in suppressing the
truth. Nevertheless, the language of the act cannot be
ignored in pursuit of its spirit even though a broad or liberal construction would obviously protect society in criminal cases where a wife is an eye witness to a murder committed by her husband. Especially would admissibility
64.

78 Neb. 645, 649, 111 N.W. 637, 639 (1907).

65. Smith v. State, 86 Tex. Cr. 624, 628, 219 S.W.2d 454, 456 (1949);
cf. Brown v. State, 33 Ala. App. 97, 31 So. 2d 670 (1946); People v. James,
40 Cal. App. 2d 740, 105 P.2d 947 (1940).
DENCE § 218 (3rd ed. 1940).
66. 395 Pa. 521, 151 A.2d 88 (1959).

See generally 1 J. WIGMORE, EvI-

67.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 683 (1936).

68.

395 Pa. 521, 528, 151 A.2d 88, 92 (1959).

seem wise if it were legally permitted where the shooting
of the victim and the defendant's 69wife is as here, so interwoven as to be actually one event.

The above statement from Commonwealth v. Clanton entails
two important concepts. First, the court shows an obvious hesitancy to go beyond the actual language of the statute in order to
make a witness competent. Secondly, it draws attention to a distinction which must be made between that which a court thinks is
right and wise, or on the contrary unwise and outmoded, and that
which is legally permissible.
It appears that the Briley case disregarded both of the concepts emphasized by the Pennsylvania court.. The Briley court
gave the spirit of the New Jersey rules of evidence making competency the rule and incompetency the exception, 70 priority over
the actual language of Rule 23(2) which provides that, "[t]he
spouse of the accused in a criminal action shall not testify ...
unless ... (b) the accused is charged with an offense against the

spouse ...."71 The decision appears to be based on public policy
rather than on a strict determination of what is legally permissible under the statute.
STATUTES RETAINING THE COMMON LAW PRIVILEGE
MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED

Historically, statutes disqualifying the spouse of the accused
from being a witness have been strictly construed. The United
States Supreme Court in Bassett v. United StateS72 held that polygamy was not to be considered a crime committed by the husband
against the wife within the language of the Utah Code of Civil
Procedure. 73 After stating the Utah statutory rule the Supreme
Court declared:
We do not doubt the power of the legislature to change
this ancient and well-supported rule, but an intention to
make such a change should not lightly be imputed. Before
such a departure from the rule ... can be judged, the

language declaring the legislative will should
be so clear as
74
to prevent doubt, as to its intent and limit.

Where the statute is unambiguous, however, it has been held that
the clear expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect,
and there is no occasion for interpretive construction1 5
69. Id. at 527, 151 A.2d at 92.
70. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
71. N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2A:84A-17(2) (1968).
72. 137 U.S. 496 (1890).
73. No. 123, [1886] Utah Acts 111 (now UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-44-4
(1953).
74. 137 U.S, at 505.
75. See State v. Riley, 83 Ida. 346, 362 P.2d 1075 (1961). This case
held that carnal abuse of a minor child of the wife of the accused was not
criminal violence against the wife, within the language of IDAHO CODE
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Another ground for strictly construing such statutes is that
they are in derogation of the common law. Such reasoning was
used by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Jenkins v. State76 in
interpreting that state's statute 77 providing that the spouse of the
accused could testify as to an injury committed by either upon the
person or property of the other. The court defined the word "property" as being limited to real or personal property and not including
children; thus, the husband of the accused could not testify against
her at the trial for murder of their child. 8 Similarly, in Grier v.
State"9 it was stated:
A wife is not permitted to testify at all except as a matter
of exception to the general rule and the provision for her
testifying being an exception it cannot be liberally extended
and must be strictly construed. 0
An objective construction of the controlling statutes demands
that the court not pass upon the reasons underlying the statute or
on the wisdom thereof. A lack of good reason is a basic ground for
legislative change.81 If the courts were to take a free hand in enlarging the statutory rules as they see fit, the result would be
judicial legislation. Such judicial conduct would to a large measure abrogate the husband-wife privilege itself, a function which
is solely for the legislature. This was the substance of the reasoning presented in Cargill v. State 2 which held that under the
language of the Oklahoma statute,8 a wife was not a competent
witness against her husband in a prosecution against him for rape
of her daugher. The crime according to the court had to be one
against the marital state as well as against society and common
decency.8 4 The court feared that an innocent spouse might be
charged with commission of an offense against one of their children
for the specific purpose of terminating the marriage relation.8 5
In some cases, however, the statutory language has been exANN. §§ 9-2031-3002 (1948). The court, therefore, held that the wife could
not testify against her husband.
76. 191 Ark. 625, 87 S.W.2d 78 (1935).
77. Act of Mar. 17, 1903, No. 81, § 1, [1903] Ark. Acts 141. (now APx.
STAT. ANN. § 43-2020 (1948).
78. 191 Ark. 625, 628, 87 S.W.2d 78, 80 (1935).
79. 153 Ga. 321, 123 S.E. 210 (1924).
80. Id. at 326, 123 S.E. at 214.
81. See Cargill v. State, 25 Okla. Crim. 314, 220 P. 64 (1923); Meade v.
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 775, 43 S.E.2d 858 (1947).
82. 25 Okla. Crim. 314,220 P. 64 (1923).
83. No. 428, [1912] Okla. Acts 279 (now OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 702
(1969).
84. 25 Okla. Crim. 314, 317, 220 P. 64, 66 (1923).
85. Id.

tended. A minority of jurisdictions have held that the language,
"crime one against the other," in statutes which frame the exception to the rule of incompetency in such language,8 6 is broad enough
to be considered as including any crime against a child as one
against the mother."7 Thus, in Chamberlainv. States8 it was held
that the word "crime" in the Wyoming statute89 meant "wrong"
against the other; therefore, the wife of the accused was permitted
to testify against him in a prosecution for statutory rape of her
daugher. The statute was held to show a legislative intent to
broaden the extension from the common law. 9 0
The wrong, which the decisions extending the exception to
crimes committed against a child of the wife seek to alleviate, is
that particular wrong to the spouse which occurs when a crime is
committed against her or her child.9 1 The cases which hold that
testimony of one spouse should be admitted against the other do so
because the crime of the other spouse has resulted in a wrong committed against the testifying spouse for which he or she should
have legal redress. 92 In no case, other than Briley, has the exception been extended by the judiciary to allow testimony as to a
crime against a third person, not a child of the witness.
CONCLUSION

In State v. Bmley the wife's testimony was the only evidence
available, other than the testimony of the defendant himself. The
court was obviously concerned with the injustice to the public
which would have occurred if the testimony of the defendant's
wife concerning the homicide of the third party had been held
inadmissible. It is submitted that it was this concern and not an
objective construction of the New Jersey rules of evidence which
led the New Jersey Supreme Court to hold as it did.
One can foresee other circumstances in which an assertion of
the husband-wife privilege would lead to the suppression of otherwise credible and admissible evidence. For example, a case may
86. E.g., ALASKA R. CRIm. Proc. 26(b) (2) (Supp. Sept. 1966).
87. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2239 (3rd ed. 1940).
88. 348 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1960).
89. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-142 (1957).
90. 348 P.2d 280, 283 (Wyo. 1960).
91. See O'Loughlin v. People, 90 Colo. 368, 10 P.2d 543 (1932),
holding that similar language in the Colorado statute, No. 29, § 1 of 1929,
Colo. Laws 642 (now COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7 (1963), was broad
enough to include any crime, whether of violence to the person, or other
crime committed by the husband or wife directly affecting the other.
92. But see State v. Kollenborn, 304 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1957). This
court, in interpreting the common law exception, held that it was not
only for the protection of the injured spouse but also for the sake of public
justice. The court allowed the wife to testify because she was the only
witness to the husband's crime upon her child. The holding can be distinguished by the fact that the court is interpreting the common law rule
rather than a statutory enactment.
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arise where spouse A kills a third person in the presence of spouse
B, whose sole function is that of a witness. If the jurisdiction in
which the crime occurs is governed by a statute retaining the husband-wife privilege, the spouse who witnessed the act must be
held incompetent to testify without the accused's consent. Thus,
the prosecution is deprived of the testimony of the only eye-witness
to the crime and must rely solely on other evidence available, if
any exists. This evidence may or may not be sufficient to sustain
a conviction.
In the final analysis, the policy of preventing one spouse
from being the instrument of the other's condemnation must be
balanced against the duty of the courts to see that criminal acts do
not go unpunished. The strictness of the common law rule has
been gradually alleviated by statute to the extent that today over
two-fifths of the jurisdictions allow either spouse to be a competent
witness for or against the other under any cricumstances. 93 In the
minds of these legislatures, the public policy of seeing that all crime
are punished outweighs the protection of marital sanctity. The
legislatures in the remaining states, including New Jersey, have not
gone to that extreme. They apparently still see good reason for
allowing the husband-wife privilege to remain as an evidentiary
rule. Instead of abrogating the privilege, they have set out a list
of exceptional situations in which the rule would create an injustice to the parties of the marriage and to the public. 94 Such
statutes are the product of years of legislative and judicial experience. They cannot easily be expanded by the judiciary, and those
states which have done so have relied upon expanding or interpreting the definition of key words within the statutes themselves.
These statutes may be inadequate in many respects, in that situations may arise where the rule will work an injustice, but the judiciary should not be the compensatory factor for myopic legislation.
JAMES A. ULSH

See statutes cited note 13 supra.
94. See statutes cited note 20 supra.
93.

